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1. Introduction 
Employment protection and unemployment benefit are economic institutions designed to 
protect people against the adverse effects of macroeconomic uncertainties that arise from 
recession, unemployment or inflation. These labor market institutions have a long tradition in 
many European countries and are widely viewed as essential ingredients of the “welfare 
state”. However, they have recently come under attack for being too costly. Moreover, they 
are implicated with jeopardizing macroeconomic performance, especially by raising 
unemployment. There is thus a proposition that certain labor market institutions aggravate 
those problems whose consequences they are designed to mitigate. 
Critical views of employment protection and unemployment benefit do, in general, not mean 
to imply that these institutions are detrimental per se. Rather, the idea seems to be that, while 
beneficial at low levels, protection and support have become excessive over the decades, such 
that their (marginal) benefit is now negative. The purpose of this paper is to study this 
proposition by examining the linkage between labor market institutions and life satisfaction in 
a number of European countries. Our approach takes into account possible feedback through 
the institutions’ impact on macroeconomic outcomes. If we find a negative overall 
relationship, this may be taken as evidence that protection and support are excessive. If the 
relationship is positive or insignificant, there doesn’t seem to be a need for cutting back on 
these institutions. 
Whether or not labor market institutions conform to their stated objectives depends on a 
number of circumstances. In the first place, protection against macroeconomic uncertainties is 
valuable only if these uncertainties have a non-negligible effect on citizens’ welfare. Whether 
this is the case has been subject to controversy for a quarter of a century. As suggested by 
Fischer (1981) and Lucas (1981), the consequences of (short-term) fluctuations may be small 
in comparison with long-term growth. Especially, eliminating all macroeconomic fluctuations 
has been estimated to be worth merely 0.05 percent of consumption (Lucas 2003). 
Criticism against this view has been raised on the grounds that it neglects important 
phenomena that are relevant to an adequate notion of welfare, like loss aversion and, 
especially, non-pecuniary effects of fluctuation and uncertainty (Layard 2005). Using data 
from large scale surveys, evidence has been presented that individual welfare -- 
operationalized by subjective well-being (happiness, life satisfaction) -- is to a considerable 
extent negatively related to recession, unemployment and inflation (Di Tella et al. 2001, 
Graham und Pettinato 2001, Bjørnskov 2003, Welsch 2006). These findings suggest that there   3
are considerable (non-pecuniary) costs to macroeconomic fluctuation and uncertainty. 
Given that evidence, the present paper investigates whether and to what extent labor market 
institutions can mitigate those costs. More specifically, we study how life satisfaction is 
affected by employment protection and unemployment benefit. While these effects may be 
thought to be unambiguously positive, this is not necessarily true: Though these institutions 
are likely to yield positive “gross utility”, their net effect depends, in addition, upon their 
“costs” (if present), in terms of tax payments, social security contributions and similar 
burdens. The sign of the relationship between life satisfaction and labor market institutions is 
thus not self-evident. It may be different for “costly” and (seemingly) “costless” institutions.  
The relationship just discussed presupposes given levels of the macroeconomic indicators and 
can be referred to as the direct relationship. In addition, however, labor market institutions 
may impact on macroeconomic performance. For instance, there is some literature 
investigating whether patterns of unemployment can be explained by variations in labor 
market institutions (see Nickell 2003 for a discussion). Through such channels, labor market 
institutions can affect life satisfaction in an indirect way. As above, the sign of the indirect 
linkage is unknown a priori, and it may differ with respect to both, the specific type of 
institution and the specific macroeconomic indicator. 
Given these possible channels of influence, the paper measures both the direct as well as the 
total (direct and indirect) linkage of life satisfaction to employment protection and the level 
and duration of unemployment benefit payments. Using data for almost 45,000 individuals in 
10 European countries, 1992-1998, we run ordered probit regressions with self-reported life 
satisfaction as the dependent variable and labor market institutions among the explanatory 
variables (controlling for individual socio-demographic characteristics and country fixed 
effects as well as country specific time trends). By estimating model versions that include and 
versions that omit macroeconomic indicators, we are able to estimate the direct as well as the 
overall relationship between life satisfaction and labor market institutions. 
In addition to confirming the common finding that poor macroeconomic performance affects 
life satisfaction in a sizeable and significant way, we obtain several intriguing results: (1) The 
labor market institutions considered reduce the adverse effect on life satisfaction of poor 
macroeconomic performance. (2) The direct linkage of life satisfaction to employment 
protection is positive (reflecting the circumstance that employment protection has little direct 
costs), whereas the direct relationship of life satisfaction to unemployment benefit (level and 
duration) tends to be negative (reflecting the costs in terms of tax payments and social 
security contributions). (3) The overall linkage of life satisfaction to employment protection is   4
positive, though of a smaller magnitude, whereas the overall relationship of life satisfaction to 
benefit duration is unambiguously negative and of a larger magnitude than the direct 
relationship. (4) The overall relationship of life satisfaction to the benefit level is 
insignificant, but may be slightly positive. (2) and (3) jointly suggest that employment 
protection and benefit duration affect macroeconomic performance negatively (by reducing 
the adjustment flexibility on the supply side). (2) and (4) jointly suggest that a higher benefit 
level may enhance macroeconomic performance (possibly by stabilizing aggregate demand).  
The previous literature has addressed the various relationships between macroeconomic 
performance, life satisfaction, and labor market institutions from several perspectives. As 
mentioned above, it is by now a standard result that macroeconomic performance affects life 
satisfaction (Di Tella et al. 2001, Graham und Pettinato 2001, Bjørnskov 2003, Welsch 2006). 
In addition, evidence has been presented of a positive relationship between the level of 
unemployment benefit and life satisfaction (Di Tella et al. 2003, Graham und Pettinato 2001). 
Furthermore, the relationship between labor market institutions and labor market outcomes 
has been studied, results tending to be inconclusive (Layard et al. 1991, Blanchard and 
Wolfers 2000, Fitoussi et al. 2000, Belot and van Ours 2001, Bertola et al. 2002, Nickell et al. 
2005; for an overview and discussion see Nickell 2003). 
The present paper focuses on the linkages between labor market institutions and life 
satisfaction. In relation to the few previous studies on this subject, our contribution is as 
follows: (1) We use a more recent data set that reflects current labor market institutions more 
accurately. (2) We consider a more comprehensive set of labor market institutions and 
distinguish between costly institutions (unemployment benefit) and seemingly costless 
institutions (employment protection). (3) We base our empirical analysis on a conceptual 
distinction between direct and indirect linkages of life satisfaction to labor market institutions. 
Overall, our analysis provides a differentiated and comparatively up-to-date benefit-cost 
assessment of labor market institutions in Europe. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the conceptual framework of our 
empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical approach. Section 4 presents 
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
This section introduces a stylized representation of the hypothesized relationships between 
labor market institutions and well-being.    5
We consider two types of labor market institutions, employment protection, P, and 
unemployment benefit, B. In the empirical part, B will be differentiated into the level and the 
duration of benefit payments. Moreover, we introduce a notional variable that captures 
macroeconomic performance, M. This variable is taken to represent macroeconomic 
performance in an inverse fashion and will thus be referred to as malaise. Empirically, it 
comprises unemployment, inflation, and slow (or negative) growth. Finally, we denote well-
being (to be operationalized by self-reported life satisfaction) by W. 
We hypothesize that labor market institutions, macroeconomic outcomes, and well-being are 
connected through several partial relationships. On the one hand, the institutions yield (gross) 
utility  U(P, B), where the function is assumed to be differentiable, with positive partial 
derivatives: UP > 0, UB > 0. On the other hand, there may be costs associated with these 
institutions, especially due to tax payments and social security contributions. These are 
captured by C(P, B), where CP  ≥ 0, CB > 0 are expected. With respect to CP, we actually 
deem it likely to be zero, since there are few generally recognized direct costs of employment 
protection. For ease of exposition we assume that U and C are commensurable in the sense 
that they can be combined to yield net utility associated with P and B, that is, U(P, B) – C(P, 
B).  
In addition to their impact on utility, labor market institutions may affect macroeconomic 
outcomes. Symbolically, this is captured by M(P, B, Z), where Z represents determinants of 
macroeconomic performance other than P and B. We do not have specific expectations as to 
the partial derivatives MP and MB, especially since M has several dimensions which may be 
affected differently by the institutions. 
The model is completed by stipulating an increasing function V(M) which represents the well-
being costs of macroeconomic malaise. 
Disregarding other determinants of well-being at this point, the relationships just discussed 
are combined to yield well-being, as follows: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, : , , W F PBM U PB CPB V M == − −    (1a)  
) , , ( Z B P M M =  (1b) 
 
The set of equations (1a) and (1b) represents the structural form of the conceptual model. By 
inserting (1b) into (1a) the reduced form is obtained:   6
 
( )()() ( ) ( ) ,, : , , ,, WG P B Z U P BC P BV M P B Z == − −  (2) 
 
With regard to the empirical implementation, two points should be observed. First, it will not 
be possible to identify U(P, B) and C(P, B) separately. Rather, we will focus on net well-
being   U(P, B) - C(P, B). Second, we will not explicitly address the macroeconomic effects 
of labor market institutions, as captured in (1b). 
In spite of that, by focusing on (1a) and (2), we will be able to differentiate between the direct 
(net) well-being effects and the overall (direct and indirect) well-being effects of labor market 
institutions. This can be seen as follows. Differentiating (1a) and (2), respectively, one 
obtains: 
 
() () PP BB M dW U C dP U C dB V dM =− +− −  (1a’) 
() () PP M P BB M B M Z dW U C V M dP U C V M dB V M dZ =− − +− − −  (2’) 
 
(1a’) shows that the structural-form equation (1a) yields the direct (net) well-being effects        
(UP - CP), (UB - CB) at given M. Depending on the size of UP relative to CP and UB relative to 
CB, the direct effect can be positive or negative. 
Likewise, (2’) shows that the reduced-form equation (2) yields the overall effects (UP - CP - 
VM MP), (UB - CB - VM MB), including the labor market institutions’ influence on M. Evidently, 
the sign of the overall effects may differ from that of the direct effects, depending on the sign 
and magnitude of MP and MB. Moreover, comparing the direct and overall effects suggests 
how the labor market institutions might influence macroeconomic performance. 
 
3. Method and Data 
We consider a life satisfaction regression of the following form: 
 
ict c ct c c t kict k k
ct ct ct ct ct ct ct ict
trend trend D
Z GR IR UR BD BR EP LS
ε δ γ γ β
α α α α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
∑ ∑ 0
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
    (3) 
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in which the dependent variable, LSict, is self-rated life satisfaction of individual i in country c 
and year t.  EPct,  BRct and BDct are measures of employment protection, the benefit 
replacement rate, and benefit duration, respectively, by country and year. URct, IRct and GRct 
are the unemployment rate, the inflation rate, and the growth rate, respectively, by country 
and year. Zct denotes indicators of macroeconomic policy (by country and year) that influence 
macroeconomic outcomes.
1 D kict refers to the kth socio-demographic characteristic of 
individual i in country c and year t, whereas trendt and trendct control for joint and country 
specific time trends.
2 Finally,  c δ  are country fixed effects and  ict ε  is the error term.  
Consistent with the discussion in the preceding section, we estimate two versions of equation 
(3). One version sets  0 7 ≡ α . This version, which corresponds to equation (1a), treats the 
macroeconomic outcomes (UR, GR, IR) as exogenous. It determines the relationship between 
life satisfaction and labor market institutions at given macroeconomic conditions and serves 
to measure the direct effect of labor market institutions on life satisfaction. The other version 
sets   0 6 5 4 ≡ ≡ ≡ α α α , while admitting  0 7 ≠ α . This version, which corresponds to equation 
(2), treats the macroeconomic outcomes as functions of the labor market institutions and 
macroeconomic policy. It serves to measure the total effect of labor market institutions on life 
satisfaction, including the feedback through macroeconomic conditions. In addition, we will 
consider a benchmark regression that includes the macroeconomic variables only 
( 0 7 3 2 1 ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡ α α α α ). This benchmark version shows how macroeconomic malaise affects 
life satisfaction if unmitigated by labor market institutions.  
Our data base covers the period 1992-1998 and refers to the following countries: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK.
3 The 
data on life satisfaction and socio-demographic characteristics are taken from the 
Eurobarometer  survey series. The Eurobarometer survey is a representative survey of 
approximately 1000 persons per country (Germany: 2000).
4 Given that not all of the required 
                                                 
1 Following the literature discussed in Nickell (2003) we use current and lagged values of the short-term interest 
rate as an indicator of monetary policy. 
2 Most of the socio-demographic characteristics are captured by category dummies (e.g. male/female). We 
choose time trends instead of time fixed effects, since the latter are perfectly collinear with the socio-
demographic dummies. 
3 Data for (unified) Germany are not available before 1992, whereas labor market institutions are available until 
1998 only.  
4 The Eurobarometer public opinion surveys are conducted on behalf of the European Commission, DG Press 
and Communication. Each consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State of persons 
aged 15 and over.   8
socio-demographic characteristics are available in all years for all countries, the regressions 
refer to 44,644 individuals. 
The life satisfaction question reads as follows: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead." The responses are 
rated as follows: "very satisfied" = 4, "fairly satisfied" = 3, "not very satisfied" = 2, "not at all 
satisfied" = 1. The socio-demographic characteristics to be included in the regression are 
income, age, sex, educational attainment, marital status, occupational status, number of 
children, and urbanization. 
The data on labor market institutions are taken from Nickell and Nunziata (2002), to which 
the reader is referred for details. Employment protection (EP) is constructed on the basis of an 
extensive collection of employment protection dimensions. It takes the value zero in the case 
of no employment protection and 2 in the case of high employment protection. The benefit 
replacement rate (BR) is a percentage of average earnings before tax and refers to the first 
year of unemployment. Benefit duration (BD) is measured by the benefit replacement rate in 
the second to fifth year of unemployment, relative to that in the first year.
5 
Summary statistics of the life satisfaction and institution data are provided in Table A1 and 
A2 in the Appendix. 
The rates of growth, unemployment, and inflation are taken from the EU’s Annual 
Macroeconomic Data Base (AMECO).
6 They are entered in our data as percentages.  
Given the discrete character of our dependent variable the model is estimated using an 
ordered probit maximum likelihood estimator (with Huber/White robust standard errors to 
control for heteroskedasticity). The probit model treats life satisfaction as specified by 
equation (3) as an unobserved, or latent, variable. The model involves threshold levels which 
determine how the continuous latent variable is translated into the discrete life satisfaction 
categories j = 1, …,4. Accordingly, the estimated coefficients from equation (3) represent 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables with respect to the latent variable. They are to be 
distinguished from the marginal probability effects MPEjl, which give the marginal effect of 
the lth exogenous variable (e.g. employment protection) on the probability of life satisfaction 
category  j.
7 Since the MPE is applicable only to continuous explanatory variables, we 
compute them only with respect to the macroeconomic variables and institutions.  
                                                 
5 More specifically, Nickell and Nunziata (2002) use the following formulation for the benefit duration indicator: 
) / ( 4 . 0 ) / ( 6 . 0 1 5 , 4 1 3 , 2 BR BR BR BR BD + = , where BR2,3 and BR4,5 denote the average benefit replacement 
rate in the second and third and in the fourth and fifth year, respectively. 
6 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm. 
7 See, for example, Greene (2003) on how the MPE is calculated.    9
 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows the main estimation results. More detailed results (especially with respect to 
the socio-demographic variables) are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. The MPE of the 
macroeconomic variables and institutions are presented in Table A4.  
 
4.1 Main Results  
Regression A confirms findings from previous literature that life satisfaction is negatively and 
significantly linked to the unemployment and inflation rate and positively and significantly to 
the growth rate. Since there is a negative association between individual unemployment and 
life satisfaction (see Table A3), general unemployment qualifies as a social bad whose effect 
concerns not just the unemployed.
8 
 
Table 1: Main regression results, 1992 – 1998, dependent variable: life satisfaction (LS) 
   (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
employment  protection    1.2001 0.5583 0.7875 0.9676 
    (2.362) (1.116) (1.608) (1.748) 
benefit replacement rate    -0.8656  0.1873  0.2187  -0.0621 
   (-1.223)  (0.281)  (0.378)  (-0.091) 
benefit  duration    -0.3790 -0.6970 -0.7666 -0.7981 
    (-0.984) (-2.044) (-2.249) (-2.314) 
unemployment rate  -0.0364  -0.0071       
 (-14.971)  (-0.651)       
inflation rate  -0.0773  -0.0508       
 (-18.826)  (-1.242)       
growth rate  0.0152  0.0297       
 (4.032)  (5.120)       
interest  rate     0.0029  0.0064 
     (0.362)  (0.768) 
lagged interest rate        0.0161  0.0181 
       (1.576)  (1.707) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
country fixed effects  9  9  9  9  9 
common time trend  9  9  9  9  9 
country time trend  9  9  9  9  9 
countries  10 10 10 10 10 
total  observations  44644 44644 44644 44644 44644 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1210 0.1132 0.1127 0.1128 0.1128 
 
                                                 
8 Especially, a high unemployment rate may create fear of losing one’s job.   10
Regression B adds our labor market institutions to the previous regression. We find that life 
satisfaction is positively and significantly related to employment protection. With respect to 
the level and duration of unemployment benefits, however, we find negative, insignificant 
relationships. There is thus a marked difference between employment protection and 
unemployment benefits, and this difference may be related to the circumstance that the former 
type of institution has no direct cost in terms of social security contributions and other 
financing mechanisms. It is thus not surprising that employment protection raises life 
satisfaction. With respect to unemployment benefits, there exist costs. Given the 
insignificance of our coefficient estimates, the utility derived from the unemployment benefit 
system seems to be more or less matched by the associated costs, at the margin. This is, of 
course, not to say that the unemployment benefit system is useless (infra-marginal effect) or 
that the level and duration of unemployment benefit are excessive. Rather, a net (marginal) 
effect not statistically different from zero can be taken to suggest that there is no reason for 
significant changes, at least as far as the direct effects are concerned.  
Our negative (though insignificant) coefficient estimate for the benefit replacement rate stands 
in contrast to the significantly positive estimate reported by Di Tella et al. (2003). However, 
that study refers to the 1970s and 1980s, a period in which the benefit replacement rate was in 
general lower than in the 1990s.
9 It is thus quite plausible that the cost burden associated with 
the unemployment benefit system was lower then, leading to a positive net effect, whereas the 
balance tends to be negative with respect to the more recent levels of benefit payments. 
With respect to the macroeconomic variables, an intriguing result is that the coefficient on 
unemployment gets strongly reduced (in comparison with regression A) and, in fact, becomes 
insignificant when the labor market institutions are accounted for. The coefficient on inflation 
drops as well and becomes insignificant, too. Employment protection and unemployment 
benefit thus seem to operate rather effectively in mitigating the adverse life satisfaction 
consequences of general unemployment and inflation. With respect to the growth rate, 
however, we find its effect strengthened. A rise in prosperity is thus more beneficial than 
suggested when labor market institutions are disregarded. A possible explanation might be 
that the security provided by the labor market institutions reduces the necessity of 
precautionary saving that would otherwise take place in periods of expansion in order to 
prepare for future recession. In this sense, labor market institutions not only mitigate the 
detrimental effects of unemployment and inflation, but also enhance the beneficial effects of a 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Nickell et al. (2005) for a discussion of labor market institutions and their developments over 
time.    11
cyclical rise in prosperity. Neglecting the labor market institutions in a life satisfaction 
assessment of macroeconomic conditions implies overstating the effects of (general) 
unemployment and inflation and understating the effect of expansion. 
Regression B has been concerned with the direct relationship between life satisfaction and 
labor market institutions, treating the macroeconomic conditions as given. Regressions C-E 
capture the idea that macroeconomic conditions may be influenced by these institutions, and 
by macroeconomic policy. To operationalize this idea, the macroeconomic variables are 
omitted, and short-term interest rates are introduced (as indicators of monetary policy). These 
regressions differ with respect to the way the interest rate is included. Since the interest rate 
impacts on aggregate demand more immediately than on inflation (Nickell 2003), we 
experiment with current and lagged values of the interest rate. The coefficients on the labor 
market institutions now represent their total effect on life satisfaction, including the channel 
via macroeconomic performance.  
Regression C includes the current interest rate. With respect to employment protection, we 
see that the coefficient gets reduced in comparison with regression B and becomes 
insignificant. This suggests that employment protection weakens macroeconomic 
performance (in an overall sense). The total marginal effect of employment protection on life 
satisfaction may thus be negligible, whereas the pure direct effect was found to be 
unambiguously positive. The results for the benefit replacement rate are different. While the 
direct effect is negative (though insignificant), the total effect is positive (but also 
insignificant). From the coefficient values in regressions B and C, one could derive the 
conjecture that a higher benefit replacement rate enhances overall macroeconomic 
performance. However, given the low precision of the estimates, such a statement may be not 
very reliable. Finally, with respect to benefit duration, the total effect is significantly negative, 
and its size is much larger than that of the direct effect. 
The interest rate has no significant effect on life satisfaction. This is not necessarily 
surprising. It seems to indicate that a favorable effect on inflation and an unfavorable effect 
on aggregate demand cancel each other. 
In regression D, which includes the lagged interest rate, the results are qualitatively similar: 
The coefficient on employment protection is larger than in C, but still smaller than in B, again 
indicating that there may be some macroeconomic cost to employment protection. The t-value 
is still rather low. The benefit replacement rate continues to be insignificant. Benefit duration 
again has a significant negative coefficient, whose magnitude is about twice as large as in 
regression B. Similar results are obtained when the current and lagged interest rates are   12
included jointly, see regression E. However, the coefficient on employment protection 
increases further and is significant at the 8% level. The results concerning the total effect of 
labor market institutions on life satisfaction are thus quite robust with respect to how the 
interest rate is included.  
When comparing the direct and total effects, our findings can be summarized as follows: 
Since employment protection has no direct costs, the direct effect is positive. There are 
however, associated macroeconomic costs, which reduce the favorable effect. The benefit 
replacement rate tends to have a negative, though insignificant, direct effect (due to the direct 
costs of the unemployment benefit system), but it seems to be neutralized by beneficial 
macroeconomic effects
10. The total effect may at best be slightly positive but insignificant. 
Benefit duration also tends to have a negative direct effect (also due to direct costs), and it 
becomes definitely negative due to macroeconomic costs. 
 
4.2 Labor Market Institutions and Individual Unemployment 
The preceding discussion has been concerned with labor market institutions in relation to 
macroeconomic uncertainty, especially due to high general unemployment. Labor market 
institutions also affect the life satisfaction consequences of actually being employed or 
unemployed, that is, individual unemployment. As Table A3 (regression A) shows, being 
unemployed strongly reduces life satisfaction. This is the case even though we control for 
income. Being unemployed thus has significant non-pecuniary costs (as already noted by, 
e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). 
When we account for labor market institutions (regression B), the negative effect of being 
unemployed not only remains. In fact, it is (slightly) increased in comparison with regression 
A. In the light of the preceding discussion, this should not be surprising: Since only 
employment protection has a positive effect on life satisfaction -- not unemployment benefits 
-- the institutions (as a whole) act to the disadvantage of the people actually unemployed 
relative to the employed.
11 Interestingly, it is not just the employed that benefit (relative to the 
unemployed), but also the housewives (and even to a larger extent than the employed 
themselves). On the other hand, retired persons or persons with “other occupation” (e.g. the 
self-employed) suffer from labor market institutions since they participate in the costs without 
enjoying the benefits. 
                                                 
10 A high benefit replacement rate may have a stabilizing effect on aggregate demand. 
11 This is what the coefficient actually says, since the employed are the reference group.   13
In contrast to the institutions themselves, their macroeconomic consequences affect people 
independent of their occupational status (the coefficients in regressions C-E are not much 
different from those in regression B). 
These findings at the individual level are quite intuitive and enhance the credibility of our 
general results. 
 
4.3 Marginal Probability Effects 
For methodological reasons, the MPE with respect to the highest life satisfaction category (j = 
4) has the same sign as the estimated coefficients reported in Table A3, wheras the opposite is 
the case for the lowest category (j = 1). Concerning the two intermediate categories, the sign 
of the MPEs depends on the estimated thresholds. In all our regressions (A-E), the MPEs of 
the intermediate categories have the same sign as the lowest category. This finding 
corresponds to the fact that average reported life satisfaction is 3.07, i.e., larger than j = 3. 
Overall, there is a monotonic relationship, that is, a positive (negative) coefficient of an 
explanatory variable increases (reduces) the probability of being happy and reduces 
(increases) that of being unhappy.  
In terms of magnitudes the MPE for j = 1 is the smallest with respect to all variables in all 
regressions. From this it follows that for those who report to be “not at all satisfied” the 
considered economic and institutional variables are of comparatively little importance with 
respect to a switch to a happier category. For example, a rise in employment protection by one 
unit in model B reduces the probability that an individual is “not at all satisfied” by just 0.06 
percentage points. The macroeconomic and institutional variables are most important with 
respect to reporting to be “very satisfied”. The variables considered thus have their largest 
impact at the top of the life satisfaction spectrum. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we undertook a comprehensive assessment of the relationship between life 
satisfaction and several types of labor market institutions in Europe. We differentiated 
between costly institutions (the unemployment benefit system) and seemingly costless 
institutions (employment protection regulation). Moreover, we differentiated the direct 
linkage of life satisfaction to labor market institutions from the total relationship that includes 
the feedback through the institutions’ effect on macroeconomic outcomes.   14
We found striking differences between the two types of institution as well as between the two 
types of effect. While the direct effect on life satisfaction is unambiguously positive in the 
case of employment protection, it tends to be negative for the level and duration of 
unemployment benefit. The total effect of employment protection, however, is weaker than 
the direct effect, and the total effect of benefit duration is unambiguously negative. The 
benefit level may have a slightly positive but insignificant effect. 
In terms of policy implications our results yield no support for the idea that employment 
protection or the level of unemployment benefit are excessive in general. Even though 
employment protection may have some adverse effect on macroeconomic outcomes, this 
effect seems to be too weak to offset the benefit which employment protection yields in terms 
of reduced uncertainty. The unemployment benefit level, conversely, is problematic on the 
grounds of the associated direct costs, but these costs seem to be neutralized by the associated 
expenditures’ role as built-in stabilizers. Conclusions with respect to the duration of 
unemployment benefits, however, are different. If our results are correct, they suggest that 
benefit duration should be carefully scrutinized in order to get the presumed beneficial effects 
more closely in line with the direct and indirect (macroeconomic) costs. 
   15
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Life satisfaction 
     Cumulative 
life satisfaction = j  Count Percent Count Percent 
1  1710 3.83 1710 3.83 
2  5953 13.33 7663 17.16 
3  24566 55.03 32229 72.19 
4  12415 27.81 44644  100 
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics of the labor market institutions 
   employment protection benefit replacement rate benefit duration 
 Mean  1.286  0.517  0.572 
 Maximum  1.920  0.780  1.020 
 Minimum  0.350  0.220  0.070 
 Std. Dev.  0.496  0.154  0.237 
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Table A3: Complete regression results, 1992 – 1998, dependent variable: life satisfaction (LS) 
   (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E) 
employment  protection    1.2001 0.5583 0.7875 0.9676 
    (2.362) (1.116) (1.608) (1.748) 
benefit replacement rate    -0.8656  0.1873  0.2187  -0.0621 
   (-1.223)  (0.281)  (0.378)  (-0.091) 
benefit  duration    -0.3790 -0.6970 -0.7666 -0.7981 
    (-0.984) (-2.044) (-2.249) (-2.314) 
unemployment rate  -0.0364  -0.0071       
 (-14.971)  (-0.651)       
inflation rate  -0.0773  -0.0508       
 (-18.826)  (-1.242)       
growth rate  0.0152  0.0297       
 (4.032)  (5.120)       
interest  rate     0.0029  0.0064 
     (0.362)  (0.768) 
lagged interest rate        0.0161  0.0181 
       (1.576)  (1.707) 
household  income  0.0586 0.0564 0.0561 0.0561 0.0561 
  (32.602) (28.835) (28.734) (28.735) (28.732) 
age  -0.0320 -0.0308 -0.0309 -0.0309 -0.0309 
  (-15.106) (-13.662) (-13.706) (-13.697) (-13.702) 
age
2  0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  (15.704) (14.466) (14.495) (14.486) (14.491) 
male reference  group 
female  0.0550 0.0588 0.0586 0.0586 0.0586 
  (4.848) (4.848) (4.835) (4.836) (4.837) 
education ≤ 15 years  reference group 
education > 15 ≤ 19 years  0.0813  0.0641  0.0634  0.0633  0.0633 
  (5.928) (4.353) (4.309) (4.299) (4.302) 
education > 19 years  0.1789  0.1668  0.1663  0.1663  0.1663 
  (10.883)  (9.376) (9.354) (9.353) (9.354) 
education  still  0.0297 0.0626 0.0609 0.0658 0.0635 
  (0.671) (1.331) (1.295) (1.401) (1.349) 
single reference  group 
married  0.1199 0.1213 0.1214 0.1213 0.1214 
  (6.834) (6.453) (6.460) (6.457) (6.460) 
living  together  0.0215 0.0314 0.0327 0.0335 0.0336 
  (0.819) (1.153) (1.201) (1.231) (1.234) 
divorced  -0.2413 -0.2518 -0.2519 -0.2515 -0.2515 
  (-7.617) (-7.595) (-7.603) (-7.589) (-7.588) 
separated  -0.3046 -0.3086 -0.3087 -0.3089 -0.3087 
  (-6.460) (-6.383) (-6.389) (-6.395) (-6.390) 
widowed  -0.1300 -0.1417 -0.1408 -0.1411 -0.1410 
  (-4.861) (-4.971) (-4.941) (-4.949) (-4.948) 
employed reference  group   19
unemployed  -0.4542 -0.4774 -0.4773 -0.4779 -0.4780 
  (-18.635) (-18.636) (-18.647) (-18.672) (-18.672) 
retired  0.0356 0.0179 0.0178 0.0180 0.0179 
  (1.742) (0.811) (0.810) (0.816) (0.815) 
housewife  0.0408 0.0453 0.0449 0.0450 0.0451 
  (2.365) (2.397) (2.375) (2.383) (2.385) 
other  occupation  0.2395 0.2059 0.2067 0.2024 0.2044 
  (5.569) (4.523) (4.543) (4.449) (4.488) 
no children  reference group 
one  child  -0.0465 -0.0410 -0.0416 -0.0416 -0.0416 
  (-3.079) (-2.520) (-2.559) (-2.556) (-2.558) 
two  children  -0.0473 -0.0497 -0.0497 -0.0497 -0.0497 
  (-2.751) (-2.677) (-2.679) (-2.678) (-2.679) 
three  children  -0.0420 -0.0449 -0.0447 -0.0443 -0.0445 
  (-1.469) (-1.470) (-1.465) (-1.453) (-1.457) 
four and more children  -0.2449  -0.2668  -0.2654  -0.2661  -0.2660 
  (-4.770) (-4.908) (-4.882) (-4.895) (-4.895) 
rural reference  group 
small  town  -0.0666 -0.0722 -0.0719 -0.0719 -0.0720 
  (-5.505) (-5.587) (-5.560) (-5.564) (-5.573) 
big  town  -0.1446 -0.1464 -0.1461 -0.1462 -0.1463 
    (-10.984) (-10.280) (-10.260) (-10.273) (-10.27)8 
limit point 2  -3.0013  -0.7693  -0.8613  -0.2505  0.0127 
  (-38.395)  (-1.045) (-1.260) (-0.330) (0.015) 
limit point 3  -2.0313  0.1561  0.0632  0.6740  0.9373 
  (-26.244)  (0.212) (0.092) (0.889) (1.105) 
limit point 4  -0.2577  1.9483  1.8544  2.4652  2.7285 
    (-3.348) (2.646) (2.712) (3.251) (3.215) 
country fixed effects  9  9  9  9  9 
common time trend  9  9  9  9  9 
country time trend  9  9  9  9  9 
countries  10 10 10 10 10 
total  observations  44644 44644 44644 44644 44644 
Schwarz  criterion  1.9482 1.9244 1.9249 1.9248 1.9250 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1210 0.1132 0.1127 0.1128 0.1128 
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Table A2: Marginal probability effect for life satisfaction = j 
   Coefficient  j = 1 j  = 2 j  = 3 j  = 4 
M o d e l   A        
unemployment  rate  -0.0364 0.0017 0.0063 0.0036 -0.0115 
growth  rate  0.0152 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0015 0.0048 
inflation  rate  -0.0773 0.0037 0.0133 0.0075 -0.0245 
M o d e l   B        
employment  protection 1.2001 -0.0602 -0.1981 -0.1212 0.3796 
benefit replacement rate  -0.8656  0.0434  0.1429  0.0874  -0.2738 
benefit  duration  -0.3790 0.0190 0.0626 0.0383 -0.1199 
unemployment  rate  -0.0071 0.0004 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0022 
growth  rate  0.0297 -0.0015 -0.0049 -0.0030 0.0094 
inflation  rate  -0.0508 0.0025 0.0084 0.0051 -0.0161 
M o d e l   C        
employment  protection 0.5583 -0.0282 -0.0923 -0.0560 0.1765 
benefit replacement rate  0.1873  -0.0095  -0.0310  -0.0188  0.0592 
benefit  duration  -0.6970 0.0352 0.1152 0.0700 -0.2203 
interest  rate  0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0009 
M o d e l   D        
employment  protection 0.7875 -0.0397 -0.1301 -0.0792 0.2490 
benefit replacement rate  0.2187  -0.0110  -0.0361  -0.0220  0.0692 
benefit  duration  -0.7666 0.0387 0.1266 0.0771 -0.2424 
lagged interest rate  0.0161  -0.0008  -0.0027  -0.0016  0.0051 
M o d e l   E        
employment  protection 0.9676 -0.0488 -0.1599 -0.0972 0.3059 
benefit replacement rate  -0.0621  0.0031  0.0103  0.0062  -0.0196 
benefit  duration  -0.7981 0.0403 0.1319 0.0802 -0.2523 
interest  rate  0.0064 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0020 
lagged interest rate  0.0181  -0.0009  -0.0030  -0.0018  0.0057 
 
 
 